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Abstract. Over the last twenty years, new public management (NPM) has 
inspired managerial reforms in public sectors worldwide [1]. The US and Italian 
governments have embraced one of the main tenets of NPM, managing for results. 
In this study, we assess the introduction of performance management practice in 
hierarchical and complex public organizations in both countries, in particular how 
and to what extent military organizations, the Italian Army (IA) and the US Navy 
Surface Warfare Enterprise (SWE), implemented performance based management 
systems (PBMS). We use the first  “form” of the framework proposed by 
Bouckaert and Halligan [2] to compare the two cases  with respect to the 
measurement, integration and use of performance information. We find that both 
organizations have encountered “benefits”. We contribute to the literature and to 
the practical use in government organizations by demonstrating some key features 
or characteristics of hierarchical, complex government organizations that enable 
or detract from the successful implementation of a PBMS.     
Keywords. Results-based management, Performance based management system, 
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Introduction 
In the last 20 years, public managers worldwide and corresponding public reforms of 
OECD countries focused principally on performance management and performance 
evaluation [1]. Government leaders have shown increasing interest in the measurement 
of performance to obtain better results [3] in terms of output and outcome. The 
paradigm of new public management (NPM) inspired this wave of reform [4]. This 
reform “paradigm” sees in the use of performance measurement and performance 
management (PMM) one of the means to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public organizations, under the slogan “value for money” [5]. NPM also motivated 
public sector reforms in the U.S. (the Government Results and Performance Act, 
GPRA) and in Italy (Cassese, Bassanini, Brunetta Reforms) [6-7]. Cepiku and 
Meneguzzo [7] note that the main similarity between the Italian and US approaches of 
NPM is performance orientation, since the 80’ for US and later 90’ for Italy. Hence, 
public administrations, including military organizations, developed and introduced 
PMM. Robinson [8; p. xxxvi] defines performance management as the broad and 
systematic use of formal information to improve public performance. The above 
definition underlies the importance of two aspects of performance-based management: 
performance information availability and the use of performance information in 
decision making processes. Several factors shown in the literature influenced 
components, contextual factors [9], technical factors, other factors (see Fryer et al  for a 
review) [10]. In this study we first compare the performance based management 
systems (PBMSs) implemented by the Italian Army and US Navy Surface Warfare 
Enterprise. For this comparison we employ the first form, specification of  components 
of PBMS (measurement, incorporation and use) presented in the Bouckaert and 
Halligan’s framework of comparative analysis [2]. Second, we identify key factors that 
enable or detract from effective use of a PBMS in both cases. We find that not all 
factors identified in previous research as necessary determinants of a successful PBMS 
are significant in the present study. Our findings confirm the relevance of knowledge 
and training [11], implementation of a new integrated information system  [12-13], and 
sub optimizing behavior  [14]. We also find that in both cases, contingent aspects 
related to organizational culture affect the use of a PBMS. Yet the public management 
literature scarcely features PBMS in military organizations. Thus, our contribution fills 
a gap in the existing literature. The research questions that we propose are:  
How do the Italian Army and US Navy Surface Warfare Enterprise manage
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 their 
performance? 
What key features of hierarchical, complex government organizations enable or detract 
from the successful use of a PBMS? 
In the first section, we present the theoretical background and the framework for 
comparing the two cases. In the second section, we discuss our research method, and in 
the third section, we analyze the cases. Finally, we provide conclusions in the last 
section. 
1. Theoretical Background 
Over the past two decades, the resurgence and new approaches to performance 
management illustrate one of the most “widespread international trends” in public 
management [15], even if not so new in theory or practice [6].   
Results-based management provided the basis for numerous public sector reform 
initiatives worldwide, stimulating increases in efficiency, effectiveness and quality of 
public services [16].  Kettl [17] states that the main purpose of managing for results is 
to improve  results and not to produce measures; thus, it is “far more useful” to see this 
process as performance-based management (PBM) instead of performance 
measurement. As Bouckaert and Van Dooren [18; p. 151] suggest, performance 
measurement is the act of measuring, while performance management is the reaction 
to performance information: “performance management is both measurement and 
management, [it is] about information and action”.  Moynihan says [19; p. 78] the 
principal idea of PBM is “using performance information to increase performance by 
holding managers accountable for clearly speciﬁed goals”. It follows that public 
administrations should produce performance information and use this information to 
inform decision making, increasing organizational performance [20]. Bouckaert and 
Halligan [2] offer a slightly different definition, stating that performance management 
is a management model that incorporates and uses performance information for 
decision making.  They clarify PBM with regard to the measurement, incorporation 
and use of performance information by stating: 
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 Performance measurement is a bundle of deliberate activities of quantifying 
performance that results in the “producing” of performance information. Performance 
measurement is a process in five steps  that targets  measurement effort, specification 
of metrics, data collection, analysis and data reporting  [6, 10]; 
 Incorporation is the process of importing performance data into documents and 
procedures with the intention of using them. The purpose is to incorporate the 
performance information in the memory and culture of the organization and finally  
integrate performance information into the policy and management cycles; 
 Uses of performance information in decision making for planning, resource 
allocation, taking corrective action and rewarding. Different managers and 
stakeholders require information for different uses [21]. Van Dooren et al. [6] 
proposed three different uses: learning, steering and control, and accountability.  
In this study, we use this framework to analyze and compare the PBMS developed and 
introduced by the IA and the US Navy SWE. A variety of factors determine successful 
the implementation of PBMS [22]. In our study regarding the factors that were 
significant in both cases, we find as did De Lancer and Holzer [11] the positive effect 
of knowledge and training on the implementation of PBMS. Brignall  and Ballantine 
among others [12-13] argue that effective IT/IS is vital to the success of PBMS, while 
Smith [14] observes that sub-optimization occurs when an optimal condition at the 
unit level leads to a sub-optimal situation at higher level. This results due to lack of 
coordination and integration among different organizational functions or areas. In our 
research we find that some aspects of the “organizational culture” influence the use of 
PBMS. The IA and the SWE are hierarchical functional organizations, based on the 
strict observation of rules and procedures. Although they shifted their focus to outputs, 
one of their main concerns remained the control and “maximization” of appropriations, 
which is a “feature” of the traditional Weberian bureaucracy [19, 23]. Pollitt [24] 
observes that the bureaucracy tends to maintain their “memory” through a range of 
“storage locations” among these he cites the experiences and knowledge of existing 
staff and the norms and values of the organizational culture [15]. Furthermore, in 
another study, Pollitt [15; p 29] affirms that “the way major institutions were set up 
and infused with particular norms casts a long shadow down the years…even when 
short term instrumental rationality indicates that change would be advantageous”. 
These institutional norms have an influence on decision making, long after the end of 
the original reasons that made them [15].   
2. Method 
To validate our research question and verify our theoretical framework, we use the 
case study method [25], in particular the multiple case study [26], to analyze 
observable events and facts in their natural conditions [27]. We selected the IA and 
SWE cases for two reasons. First, the two organizations provide classical examples of 
hierarchical, multi-layered organizations exhibiting multiple objectives of many public 
organizations. Second, we had the access to data and key knowledgeable personnel.  
With little comparative research on PBMS in military organizations, we have valuable 
resources with which to begin to fill this gap. 
 
2.1 Case Study Italian Army 
We chose the Italian Army for the case study because we have access to the case study 
information [28]. We use different data collection techniques and sources of evidence 
to provide information with which to compare the IA to the SWE. We rely on a series 
of semi-structured interviews using the procedures described by Yin [26], along with 
internal documents, direct observations and archival records. Using this research 
material, one author analyzed and inductively coded the evidence to provide the basis 
of this study [29]. 
 
2.2 Case Study US Navy Surface Warfare Enterprise   
We also chose the SWE because one author participated in the Webb and Candreva  
study [30] and analyzed the SWE reporting and use of performance information. Webb 
and Candreva employed a case study research design to investigate the SWE’s 
activities and decisions. Research material included briefings, notes of briefings, 
internal documents, meeting minutes and other archival information on the SWE 
Intranet. The authors conducted approximately 25 hours of interviews with members 
of the enterprise, representing cross-functional (personnel, maintenance, etc.) teams, 
class (type of ship) squadrons, and contractor support. 
3. Case Presentations 
3.1 Organizational environment 
The Italian Army, composed of about 400 sub-organizations, functions as a hierarchy 
for direction and coordination. Sub-organizations perform heterogeneous activities, 
use different resources and competences, and pursue specific goals [31]. The IA’s 
mission, “to provide the generation and preparation of a land force component with 
adequate readiness given the available resources for the homeland security and the 
turnover in international military operations” (OBS 213) [32], results in an output 
measured by proxies for military readiness (percentage of “ideal” readiness), task 
force generation (percentage related to a standard) and expenditures (percentage of 
financial resources allocated versus expended). 
Recent budget cuts to the IA resulted in acute difficulties in meeting the IA mission
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The IA appropriation for operational expenditures declined by 70% in the last nine 
years from € 1,028 in 2004 to € 310 million in 2012, not adjusted for inflation [32-33]. 
The Surface Warfare Enterprise, an organization within the US Navy, commanded by 
a three-star admiral, supports the 162 surface ships of the U.S. Pacific and Atlantic 
Fleets. In 2008, SWE personnel managed approximately $5.2 billion in annual 
operation and maintenance funds for the readiness of the surface fleet. The SWE 
responsibilities include providing ready ships, and “optimizing” warfighting readiness 
of the Navy’s surface fleet. The SWE mission, “warship ready for tasking” for 
multiple possible operational missions, requires SWE personnel to provide ready ships 
with a given performance measure [34]. Although the SWE did not experience 
significant budget cuts during the period of study, the US Navy leaders’ expectation 
was to link the PBMS to budget decisions.  Webb and Candreva [30; p. 525] report 
that “Navy leaders express[ed] their desire to drive the budgeting process.” While both 
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five years http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17042065 02/15/2012. 
IA and SWE function as traditional military-hierarchical organizations, with missions 
to provide outputs (not outcomes, such as battles won or situations resolved, at least in 
peace [35]), their leaders face different issues. In the IA case, leaders, focused on 
internal and external accountability, by attempting to properly communicate 
performance and increase the organization’s chance of survival, while SWE leaders 
concerned themselves with increasing efficiency, particularly technical efficiency, to 
free up resources [6]. 
 
3.2. Analysis and comparison 
 
Framework of analysis 
In this study, we analyze the two cases using one of Bouckaert and Halligan’s forms  
of analysis[2] from their performance management framework. Specifically we use the 
first form, “specification of the components” of performance management 
(measurement, incorporation and use). We use only the first form as our research aim 
is limited only to the analysis of key factors that enable or hinder the implementation 
of a PBMS, while Bouckaert and Halligan’s study focused mainly on comparisons of 
real country cases to obtain the “dominant performance model of central government”.  
In the following section we describe first how each organization carries out 
measurement, incorporation and use of the performance information, followed by a 
comparison of the two organizations.   
 
Performance Measurement 
In this section, we present analyses of the main activities of performance measurement 
in both organizations. We target the measurement efforts, including how managers 
selected performance indicators, collected data, interpreted the results and reported the 
performance information [6, 10]. We also assess the quality of the processes and the 
quality of the process of both organizations, looking at validity (capacity to logically 
represent the construct measured), reliability (repeatability of measurement), and 
accuracy (the capacity to  measure the actual value)  [36] . 
 
Italian Army 
To begin to manage performance, Italian Army personnel mapped the organization’s 
main internal processes and activities related to operational expenses
3
. IA managers 
determined outputs for each activity, using the Goal Question Metric approach [37], 
selected applicable metrics (performance targets based on outputs; expenses for output 
units; amounts of outputs provided and impairment thresholds) and indicators, which 
are combinations of metrics (for details, see Sarcià 2010 [38]).  Thus, using the outputs 
and measures defined then integrating these data into the strategic and financial 
planning processes, the IA created an output-based budget based on historical data. 
This budget links IA strategic objectives, operational objectives and operational 
programs to financial figures. Additionally, IA personnel calculated a composite 
measure of military readiness for the entire organization by aggregating the percentage 
achievement of different outputs, weighted by an “impact factor” (the average of five 
years of appropriations for a particular output as a percentage of five years of total IA 
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expenses depend on manning levels, which are set by law, and are thus a fixed cost, and investments are in 
the budget authority of the Ministry of Defense. 
appropriations). IA managers can then examine the composite measure, which ranges 
from 0-100% and recalculate readiness using “what-if” analysis that allows managers 
to simulate alternative funding levels, providing the rate of performance (% military 
readiness) obtainable by the whole organization for each amount of allocated resources. 
This predictive model permits drilling-down into activities and their expenses to 
highlight ex ante those areas that may experience organizational failures in terms of 
low performance for a given resource allocation. In practice, the “what-if” analysis 
and measures of expected performance provide a sort of benchmark, identifying 
achievable targets for organizational functions or areas with a given level of funding. 
Data collection supports the measurement of military activities, expenditures and 
readiness. Data come from internal transactional data bases, especially an internal 
legacy IT system. Sub-organization managers provide objective data such as logistic 
and training outputs. Other data come from self assessment. Managers use the data to 
analyze how well sub-organizations provided their outputs. They compare output 
generated with the given budget to a performance target set based on historical output 
(five-year average expenses resulting in some amount of outputs, as noted in the 
preceding paragraph). Currently, IA managers report quarterly performance. The 
performance report usually does not exceed 100 pages and depicts graphs and 
measures depicted using traffic lights (red, brown, yellow, green and pea green). The 
IA is also currently engaged in developing and testing advanced IT solutions, SiAPS+. 
These solutions use open source applications based on the field of business 
intelligence. However, the system is not fully operational because some components 
need to be further tested before being deployed. Whenever this system will be fully 
operative, it will supply a powerful tool providing essential and up to date information 
to all organization levels, through internet access.  
In the implementation of IA performance measuring tools, managers observed several 
quality issues including problems related to accuracy in data availability and 
collection. This results because managers have data on operational expenses for each 
output rather than actual costs (to include personnel, investment, and other expenses 
not part of operations expenses), thus the unit of measurement is unit expense, not unit 
cost. As is the case with many government organizations, the internal information 
system uses a cash-based accounting system rather than a system based on costs. In 
addition to problems of accuracy and systematic errors, leaders suspect two other 
critical factors of performance measurement related to two dysfunctional behaviors 
[14, 39]. The first behavior, sub-optimization, results when individuals and sub-
organizations optimize performance in their own parts of the organization, but do not 
properly integrate processes among different functions. Interviews revealed that during 
the year, decisions to allocate resources among functions or sub-organizations may 
have reflected priorities for a subordinate part of the IA, and sometimes not related to 
the whole organization due to the lack of an integrated system for financial 
information. The second behavior, gaming, results when self-assessed data result in 
distortion or manipulation of reported outputs. As Hood [40; p. 516]  suggests, this 
mismanagement of information can result in “ hitting the target and missing the point” 
. 
 
US Navy Surface Warfare Enterprise 
As in the case of the IA, SWE leaders outlined main internal processes and activities 
related to operations. Using these processes and activities, personnel designed five 
composite performance measures based on five critical performance algorithms or 
“figures of merit (FOM).” One composite measure describes mission readiness relative 
to each of personnel, equipment (maintenance), supplies, training, and ordnance (or 
the acronym “PESTO”). One senior officer oversees each of the PESTO areas across 
ship classes (frigate, destroyer, cruiser and amphibious), and one product line manager 
oversees each of the ship classes.  Each class of ships has unique systems, 
requirements and capabilities, thus product line managers prepare individual ships 
according to the ship’s technology and expected mission requirements. To meet the 
Navy’s goal to project power anytime, anywhere, ships must be ready to function 
independently and interdependently, complemented by advanced technological reach 
from other assets. SWE personnel first evaluate ships for mission readiness 
independently, providing a FOM or composite measure that serves as a proxy for the 
output, “readiness.” Combatant commanders (at some point) evaluate an individual 
ship within the group of assets with which it deploys. Navy leaders have an inherent 
belief that a properly trained and assessed individual ship will be capable of 
successfully integrating with others for all possible missions.  
PESTO algorithms attempt to capture the relationships among the inputs, activities or 
processes, and outputs in a way that simplifies performance measurement. SWE 
personnel use composite proxy measures, standardized along a 0-100 scale, to indicate 
readiness.  Using a stoplight chart where colors reflect scores (green=90-100; blue=80-
90; yellow=70-80; and red<70), each PESTO indicator provides information on how 
well a ship can perform a certain type of mission relative to the five PESTO functions. 
For example, a ship listed as red with respect to equipment cannot perform the mission 
due to a low maintenance score. Importantly, SWE personnel negotiated and agreed 
upon each underlying algorithm that provides output (readiness) measures. The 
maintenance performance indicator, for example, comes from an algorithm that 
assigns values to repair tasks weighted according to their impact on mission 
accomplishment. Internal databases provide the data that feed the PESTO algorithms. 
In particular, financial figures come from legacy IT systems.  SWE personnel attempt 
to use “cost 4 ” data to analyze efficiencies. Five analyses exist, each portraying 
different aspects of “cost5”.  The first analysis mines data to examine purchases and to 
assess whether the quantity or price paid for those purchases can be reduced. The 
second compares the spending on ships of the same class based on (ship) homeport. 
The third analysis charts cumulative year-to-date spending against rolling averages of 
performance. The fourth uses the stoplight-coding schema for readiness indicators and 
attempts to compute the cost to move a ship from one (stoplight) status to the next. 
The fifth analyzes spending on particular missions in an attempt to understand or 
manage the “cost5” of those missions.  
SWE personnel measure and report readiness consistent with the overarching Defense 
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), a defense-wide IT system for reporting military 
unit readiness for a given mission. The DRRS is very close to an internal BI solution, 
which focuses on military readiness rather than the “bottom line”. Performance 
measures change daily through the recording of maintenance actions, personnel 
changes, training events, etc. The DRRS captures activities that change the readiness 
measures in a way that anyone with access to the database can drill down to find 
reports on individual action items by ship.  As in the case of the IA, SWE performance 
measures exhibit quality problems due to data inaccuracy, and systematic errors and 
biases. As of 2008, the SWE had not made the leap from its longstanding 
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encumbrance-based budgeting and accounting systems to systems of cost accounting 
that could provide performance-based cost information. Similarly, SWE personnel 
note that sub-optimization affects performance measurement. Rather than being solely 
a behavioral issue, SWE personnel recognize that sub-optimization may be driven by 
the use of composite measures. They recognize that managers cannot aggregate the 
PESTO performance indicators to calculate a single measure of “warships ready for 
tasking.” SWE leaders know they cannot aggregate scores calculated from different 
composite algorithms. Thus, managers can optimize resource allocation within a 
functional area but cannot calculate an optimal mix of resources for the organization as 
a whole.  As in many cases, SWE performance management requires subjective use of 
available performance information. Finally SWE managers noted that several PESTO 
measures added nothing to the understanding of performance. Van Dooren et al. [6] 
describe this as a problem of  performance measurement dysfunction, information 
overloading or indicator mushrooming. 
 
IA and SWE performance measurement comparison 
The two cases, even with contextual differences, share some commonalities. The 
organizational “culture” and overarching concerns about appropriations result in the 
use of obligations and expenditures as proxies for costs in both organizations. These 
issues are twofold. The first is technical. The introduction of a new information system 
that can support newly-recognized information needs is crucial for effective 
performance measurement. As Kaplan and Norton [12] note, an unresponsive 
information system can be the Achilles’ heel of a performance measurement system. 
Information technology  plays a critical role in making performance measurement  
possible [41]; thus implementing an enterprise resource planning (ERP) and business 
intelligence (BI) solution gives a more realistic picture of the organization. The second 
aspect is related to the culture of an organization, its internal knowledge. In both the 
IA and SWE managers lack some performance measures, especially cost-related 
measures; their knowledge and focus is concentrated mainly on annual appropriations 
and obligations. As a consequence sub-optimal behavioral dysfunction arises because 
managers cannot properly integrate across functional areas and sub-organizations’ 
performance information,  and, because they focus on expense data rather than costs, 
their views are biased. 
 
 
Incorporation of Performance Information 
Incorporation means to extend performance information by importing it into the 
management cycle (planning, monitoring, evaluation, feedback) with the intention of 
using the information. In other words if the performance related data are integrated in 
organizational processes and documents, they will ultimately be incorporated in its 
“culture and memory” [2]. We considered only the management cycle because the 
political and contractual cycles are outside the scope of our investigation. We mean 
the management cycle as ex ante planning and programming, ex nunc monitoring, ex 
post evaluation and finally feedback [6]. 
 
Italian Army 
We observed that the IA leaders introduced the performance information (average 
expense per output and the target output for 100% of military readiness, etc.) in the 
planning process of the output-based budget. Additionally a report from each IA 
function fed this activity indicating in detail three possible resource allocation levels 
with corresponding output levels and issues (risks or pitfalls). Furthermore, “what if 
analysis” supported this process predicting the possible areas where lack of resources 
could cause organizational failures (e.g., military readiness would fall short due to an 
established impairment threshold
5
). The quarterly performance report provided 
performance data on the monitoring process using graphs and traffic lights. 
Additionally, if more resources became available during the year, e.g., for 
international peacekeeping operations, an ad hoc performance report and “what if 
analysis” could support in the decision making for resource allocation the Chief of 
Army General Staff. Performance-related data were introduced partially in the 
evaluation process. In fact the annual performance report and its performance 
information fed only organizational evaluation; these data did not support the 
evaluation of military personnel. Finally the performance information of previous 
years were used in the procedures and processes for reviewing the PBMS for the next 
year, principally for updating output unit expenses  and changing metrics and/or 
indicators. 
 
Surface Warfare Enterprise  
We noted that the PESTO performance information supported the four processes. In 
particular the DRRS and PESTO five pillar data fed the monitoring process almost in 
real time. SWE leaders did not include performance-related data on individuals due to 
an existing personnel evaluation system and mandatory procedures. 
 
IA and SWE comparison incorporation of performance information  
We observed that both the IA and the SWE introduced performance information in all 
four components of the management cycle. However, we noted different degrees of 
incorporation in the two organizations. The IA use performance information in a more 
“institutionalized” way in the planning phase than the SWE. In fact different 
performance-related data fed this process in the IA (unit expense for output, target for 
100% military readiness, target for allotted resource, what if analysis, possible pitfalls 
for lack of resource). The SWE used performance-related data in a more integrated use 
of performance related data in the monitoring process. The PESTO measures provided 
timely performance information on current activities. These findings are consistent 
with the different informational uses of both organizations, accountability for the IA, 
and steering and control for the SWE. Finally we observed that in both cases the 
processes of evaluation of military personnel were not well integrated with 
organizational performance information because both organizations have other 
systems that measure performance of individuals under mandatory service 
requirements. 
 
Use of performance information 
In this section we analyzed why and how both organizations use performance 
information in different components of the management cycle. To answer the “why” 
question, we considered three possible uses of performance information: learning; 
steering and control; and accountability. These do not exclude each other, but one use 
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 Organization managers define an impairment threshold as a level of financial 
resources under which the whole organization or a function provides insufficient or no 
outputs or services. 
tends to prevail over the others. Indeed, to answer the “how” question, we studied the 
use of performance information in the different components of the cycle. 
 
 
 
Italian Army 
The main use of performance information for the IA was for external and internal 
accountability reasons. Due to the global economic crisis and the consequent fiscal 
crisis, the IA budget suffered a severe cut: “everyone must cut back by… %”[42]. 
Hence, to have more resources, the Ministry of Economy and Finance requested more 
transparency and required showing outputs against resources. This, combined with a 
new enacted law (150/2009) prescribing introduction of the performance management 
cycle in all public organizations, provided the stimuli for the implementation of IA 
performance-based management. In fact almost all of the officers interviewed pointed 
this crucial moment for survival of the organization. Moreover the commanders of the 
operative units, being accountable for the full “readiness” of their organizations, saw 
in the system a way to report their accountability.  
The IA Army principally used performance information for planning the annual 
output-based budget. During the ex ante phase the performance-related data 
intensively supported and were used for resource allocation. Performance information 
only slightly influenced decisions about resource allocation and corrective action 
during the year. At the end of the year the organizational evaluation resulting from 
performance data mainly served for external accountability. However, the evaluation 
process of military personnel used another set of measures and procedures, while the 
evaluation of civilian managers is based on them. Finally performance information fed 
the feedback process. Interviewees affirmed that after the annual report and before 
budget planning, they updated the performance system, i.e. updating a unit expense of 
an output or developing new metrics and indicators. Furthermore they observed that 
officers in charge of different functions had an active part in this phase and usually 
suggested new developments in the system. 
IA managers intensively used performance information for planning of the output-
based budget. This is consistent with the organizational purpose of communicating IA 
output performance (external accountability). The slight use of performance 
information during the year for taking corrective actions was principally due to lack of 
an integrated information system that would allow obtaining an optimum resource 
allocation (or reallocation) across  organizational functions.  
 
Surface Warfare Enterprise 
The SWE managers used performance information primarily for steering and control 
or internal processes, increasing internal (technical) efficiency. In fact, SWE leaders 
faced a challenge of continuously improve technical efficiency in the core areas of 
maintenance, logistics, manning and training to create budget slack so the Navy could 
increase its purchase of ships, ammunition, and fuel. We noted that SWE leaders 
attempted to create a performance budget using the information supplied by PESTO. 
In practice, however, PESTO only served to direct corrective actions and resource 
allocations based on PESTO information. At every operational level within the SWE 
(e.g., maintenance, crew training, etc.), PESTO provided performance information to 
assess readiness of a ship in one of the five PESTO dimensions.  Overall 
organizational evaluation was related to this. Finally expense analysis employed the 
information data for resource allocation. We observed that the SWE principally used 
performance information for taking corrective actions during the monitoring phase. 
This is consistent with the main steering and control use performance information by 
SWE managers.  
 
IA and SWE comparison of performance information use 
We found that both organizations use performance information for evaluation only in 
part. Personnel evaluation occurs through different processes and systems due to legal 
and other mandatory reasons; thus no personal rewards or incentives exist within the 
PBMSs. Similarly, the evaluation systems of the organizations have no provision for 
rewarding organizations for meeting performance targets (e.g., increasing funding, 
allowing carrying over of efficiency gains, providing bonuses, etc. [43; p. 174]). We 
noted that three main factors, somewhat related each other, hindered the functional use 
of performance information in both organizations. The first was a technical factor, the 
absence of an integrated financial information system, “where… [the] accounting 
system shift[ed] to [a] cost accounting system…in a coherent a systematic way”[2; p. 
112]. In fact both organizations did not have a holistic system (i.e. enterprise resource 
planning system integrated + a business intelligence system) that permitted them to 
identify the priorities across different organizational functions and to calculate costs 
(consumption of inputs) of the output produced rather than calculating expenses 
(purchase of inputs). The second was a lack of knowledge and general understanding 
of on performance management [11]. We noted that obligations (promises to pay) 
were normally used as proxies of cost. Costs of personnel (which were and are the 
largest costs for both organizations) were not included due to the inability to integrate 
personnel costs and systems into the performance management system.. The third was 
related to “organizational culture”. Both organizations tried to control and increase 
their budget appropriations using performance information. The IA uses the PBMS for 
external accountability, and the SWE tried to “link” the PBMS to budget decisions. 
This focus on appropriations is rooted in the “memory” of the traditional bureaucracy 
[19, 23].  
These three factors relate to each other. The focus on appropriations has as a 
consequence the focus on obligations; as Webb and Candreva [30; p. 545] note about 
the SWE case, “[i]nstitutional norms and overarching concerns about preserving, 
consuming, and expanding appropriations result in the use of inappropriate proxies for 
cost”. Thus it is logical that if appropriations and obligations are important there is no 
need for a cost-based accounting system. Finally, these factors resulted in 
organizational sub optimization and a dysfunctional allocation of resources because 
decision making relied on inaccurate performance information. 
Conclusion 
The IA and SE made strong commitments to introduce PBMSs, which they accepted 
as a rational modern technique. However, to assess whether the systems are functional 
requires evaluating them against three factors: 
 introduction of an integrated financial information system that tracks and records 
the costs of the outputs; 
 improvement of technical knowledge and training on performance management 
in the whole organization to increase the accuracy of PBMS; and 
 changing organizational “memory” that still “remembers” decision making based 
on inputs, even if managers or leaders make decisions based on outputs; 
The present research provides a starting point for understanding the factors that 
managers of large, hierarchical government organizations should assess in their 
attempts to manage performance. The main limitations of this study are two. First we 
did not consider the institutional aspects of both organizations, specifically national 
culture [44], national systems, [15] policy cycles of PBM [2], and national budgeting 
processes. Second, both organizations are still involved in reviewing and developing 
their PBMS. Future research could examine similar cases of the implementation of a 
PBMS by public administrations, based on the factors this study provided on 
performance management integration in military-bureaucratic organizations. 
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